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This paper examines empirically the role of market structure for the influence of spill-
over effects on R&D-cooperations. The results of a microeconometric analysis, based 
on firm data on innovation, let in general presume that with intensified competition also 
the influence of spillovers on R&D-cooperation increases. However, competition seems 
to induce firms to search for effective firm-specific appropriation facilities first. 
Spillovers that are sufficiently high such that the internalisation effect from R&D-
cooperation more than outweighs the competitive effect from research, only arise 
whenever firms are not able to protect their research results through any appropriation 
facility. Additionally, there is some evidence that spillover effects may even hinder 
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This paper examines empirically the incentive of firms to cooperate in R&D whenever 
they are not able to fully appropriate their research results. In contrast to previous theo-
retical and empirical papers, it mainly analyses which role market structure, essentially 
the intensity of competition, plays for the influence of spillover effects on R&D-coope-
rations.  
Spillover effects arise whenever know-how or research results of one firm are used by 
other firms without the latter having to bear any expenses. Having in mind these exter-
nal economies due to research, several lines in economic theory see spillover effects as 
purely advantageous. However, when the researching firm has to fear that its internal 
research may indirectly spur competitors’ profits, it will retain from investing into 
R&D. On the aggregate, investment into R&D may be suboptimal. Economists are pro-
posing cooperations in R&D as one means for solving this market-failure due to spillo-
ver-effects. The idea is that by co-ordinating R&D, the external effect is exploited and 
by exchanging research results, know-how is disseminated. However, firms actually 
have to have an incentive to bind themselves in such contractual arrangements in order 
to internalise spillover effects. According to the basic line of theoretical results the in-
centive for cooperations in R&D exists whenever spillover-effects are sufficiently high 
such that the positive internalisation effect of cooperation more than outweighs the ne-
gative competitive effect from investment into research.  
By and large, the incentive to cooperate depends on the structure of the market where 
the firms are operating. On the one hand, the type and the intensity of competition on 
the product market and during the innovation process determine the extent of the 
competitive effect from research. Additionally, spillover effects themselves may 
intensify (potential) competition. As a consequence, the threat of potential competition 
induces firms to invest heavily into R&D; there may be a high incentive to internalise 
spillover effects within R&D-cooperations. On the other hand, there are some doubts 
whether firms, especially those that have been successful in building up high market 
power, actually have an incentive to cooperate in R&D. One reason is that high market 
power reflects efficient research and production. Therefore, this firm is not easily 
affected. Or, it may even fear to increase the probability of their competitors winning 
the race by passing on its internal research results via co-ordination.  
This paper analyses empirically the role of market structure for the incentive to coope-
rate in R&D in order to internalise spillover effects. This is done using a logistic regres-
sion model based on firm level data on innovation. The analysis starts with a short dis-
cussion of the main theoretical arguments in chapter 2. After elaborating on some cru-
cial methodological points, the presentation of the empirical results will follow in chap-
ter 3. The paper will close with a final assessment of the role of market structure for the 
internalisation aspect of R&D cooperations. 
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2. Theoretical  Background 
2.1  Spillover Effects in Theory 
The term ‘spillover effects’ has reached a central position within the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on the economics of innovation and technological change. Spillover ef-
fects1 arise whenever firms use know-how of another firm without the researching firm 
being able to control or influence the degree of this unintended knowledge transfer. 
R&D thus produces a positive external effect in favour of other firms. From the 
viewpoint of social welfare, there is reason enough to promote spillovers, since they 
spur the dissemination of new knowledge available for the whole society. From the 
viewpoint of the single firm, however, spillovers may be judged negatively. The indivi-
dual firm fears that competitors use its internal research results and thus probably inc-
rease their profits without having to bear the expenses. Therefore, the researching firm 
will only have limited incentive to invest into R&D. 
Spillover effects may arise in the production as well as in the diffusion phase of the in-
novation process.2 According to Geroski (1994:102), the appropriability of a firm, i.e., 
its capacity to protect its research results, depends on various factors. These are for 
example the technology itself, the barriers to entry which exist on the market where the 
technology is used, and the capability of other firms to absorb external knowledge 
within their internal innovation process. According to Tirole (1993:403-4) there is only 
limited incentive for this firm to develop and launch a new product whenever one firm 
has to fear quick imitation. Instead of investing into R&D it will rather wait for a com-
petitor to develop and launch the product first.  
Spillover effects may thus lead to suboptimal R&D investment. However, R&D is es-
sential for the production of innovations itself, both for the internal innovating process 
of the individual firm as well as for its capacity to absorb external knowledge. Additio-
nally, R&D is essential as a foundation for innovations and thus for the overall perfor-
mance of an economy. On the one hand, process innovations may be growth-inducing 
via increased productivity. On the other hand, product innovations may lead to higher 
consumer welfare via increased product variety.3 Standard means to correct for the mar-
ket failure due to spillover effects include R&D-subsidies and a stronger patenting sys-
tem. However, subsidies have to be financed by taxes and may - according to Katz and 
                                                 
1  This notion is equivalent to the notion ‘technological spillovers’ that Katz and Ordover (1990) use in 
order to distinguish the external effects due to lack of appropriability from the pecuniary external ef-
fect from research itself, which they call the ‘competitive spillovers’. 
2  With regard to this, Katz and Ordover (1990:154) distinguish between ‘intermediate’ and ‘final tech-
nological spillovers’. 
3  Concerning the relevance of spilloves for economic welfare and growth see for instance, Krugman 
(1992), Leahy and Neary (1997), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Coe and Helpman (1995). 
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Ordover (1990:140) - distort the incentive structure of firms with respect to their R&D 
investment decision. Strengthening the property rights through patents guarantees (tem-
porary) monopoly power for one firm. This may restrict competition and may  -accor-
ding to Klodt (1995:32-38) - lead to welfare losses. More recent theoretical models fo-
cus on the question whether spillover effects can be internalised by the firms through 
binding contractual arrangements in research and development (R&D-cooperations). 
Fundamental for the functioning of such R&D-cooperations as an internalisation device 
is that firms actually have an incentive to co-ordinate their R&D-activities with other 
firms when spillover effects arise. 
2.2  R&D-Cooperations in Theory 
With the help of a simple duopoly-model, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) made 
clear how spillover effects are actually internalised by R&D-cooperations.4 In their mo-
del two individual firms engage in Cournot competition, i.e., they are maximising their 
profits through the choice of the output level. Since they are using R&D as strategic in-
vestment, the firms additionally have to decide how much they want to invest into 
R&D. In order to separate the maximisation process with respect to these two 
parameters R&D-input and level of production it can be thought of a two-stage-decision 
process: On the first stage the firms decide upon their R&D-investments. On the second 
stage, they maximise their respective profits through the choice of the production level 
given a specific level of R&D.  
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin concentrate on a model with process innovation. There are 
three channels through which internal R&D influences a firm’s profit: Firstly, R&D di-
rectly causes (fixed) investment costs. Secondly, in the case of successful process inno-
vation, R&D reduces production costs. Thus, the direct costs of producing innovations 
counterweigh the indirect cost reduction in the production of the final good. Thirdly, 
there is an indirect channel the sign of which depends on the reaction of the 
competitors. In this respect, Katz and Ordover (1990:150) speak of ‘competitive 
spillovers’.5 With the firms acting independently from each other, each firm has an 
incentive to invest into R&D. R&D reduces marginal costs and thus increases profits 
from extended production. In the case of strategic substitutes, i.e., if the other firm 
                                                 
4  This analysis will concentrate on the empirical test of the general theoretical relationship between 
spillover effects and R&D-cooperation. Therefore, the basic model of the duopoly itself should only 
illustrate the decision-making process of the individual firms. A direct implementation would have to 
start from an oligopoly and distinguish between product and process innovations. However, 
according to Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), Morasch (1994) and the model for product-
innovations of Motta in Konrad (1997) the central results will not change significantly by these 
extensions. R&D-cooperations and spillover effects in an open economy are analysed by Leahy and 
Neary (1997). 
5  Sometimes, the terminus 'business-stealing effect' is used, for instance in Konrad (1997) and König et 
al. (1994). 
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reacts with a reduction of its own production, the researching firm can increase its 
market share and thus its profit. There is no incentive to co-operate. However, with both 
firms investing into R&D simultaneously, more overall output is produced, leading to 
lower prices and thus lower profits for each firm. In this case, R&D intensifies 
competition on the product market.  
Whenever spillover effects prevail, there is a fourth channel through which R&D in-
fluences the profits of the firms. In models of process innovations, spillover effects oc-
cur when additionally to internal R&D some part of external R&D influences the pro-
duction costs of the individual firm. In that case, the reduction of marginal costs through 
R&D is already achieved at a lower level of internal R&D. However, internal R&D re-
duces marginal costs of the competitor, too. Thus it increases the competitors’ profits 
indirectly by influencing its market share. When both firms act independently from each 
other (R&D competition), each firm can profit from the know-how of the competitor. 
However, the incentive to invest into R&D diminishes due to the external effect of 
spillovers in favour of the competitor. In contrast, when the firms are co-ordinating their 
R&D activities, they can exploit this external effect. Morasch (1994:52) names it the 
positive ‘indirect efficiency effects’: Synergies between the research projects are 
exploited and double research is prevented. According to the theoretical model, there is 
an incentive to co-operate whenever high spillover effects prevail.6 In this case, the po-
sitive internalisation effect from cooperation more than outweighs the negative compe-
titive effect from research.7 
R&D-cooperation in general can take two forms. First, the firms form an R&D-cartel on 
the first stage of the decision process. Thereby, they co-ordinate the amount of R&D 
they want to invest in order to maximise the common profit. Second, they form an R&D 
joint venture on the second stage by exchanging their research results without any 
agreement on the actual R&D-investment. According to Kamien et al. (1992), the opti-
mal form of cooperation is the RJV-cartel. There, the firms co-operate with respect to 
both, the amount of R&D to be invested as well as the exchange of knowledge. On the 
one hand, exchanging the research results enables both firms to make use of all know-
ledge. On the other hand, while R&D still influences the profit of the competitor, this 
external effect is internalised by maximisation of the common profit. Both firms there-
fore have again an incentive to invest into R&D. Furthermore, according to Kamien et 
al. (1992:1302) the binding agreements on both stages reduce the incentive for free-ri-
                                                 
6  In d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1998) the critical value is around 0,5. This means that half of the re-
search results of one firm can be used by the other firm. Simulations by Morasch (1994) support this 
result. 
7  In this case, additional effects preventing cooperation like asymmetric information and coordination 
problems are counteracted. For a survey of theoretical models that handle these topics, see Bihn 
(1997) and Scherer (1997). Morasch (1994) shows that also in oligopoly models the incentive for 
R&D cooperations increases with increasing spillover effects. The incentive is even higher when the 
spillovers between members are higher than spillovers to non-members. 
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der-behaviour. Thus, internalising the spillover effects through an RJV-cartel counte-
racts exactly the two channels through which suboptimal R&D would result in the case 
of competitive research: the co-ordination of the R&D-inputs encourages R&D and thus 
innovation. The exchange of research results provides the dissemination of knowledge 
throughout the whole economy.  
2.3  The Influence of Market Structure 
The incentive to cooperate depends on the structure of the market where the firms are 
operating. On the one hand, the type and the intensity of competition on the product 
market and during the innovation process determine the extent of the competitive effect 
from research. Additionally, spillover effects themselves may intensify (potential) com-
petition: They reduce production costs of the competitors, which again may alleviate 
market entry. Or, immediate technological spillovers may increase the probability with 
which the competitor succeeds with his innovation. As a consequence, the efficiency ef-
fect of R&D-investment comes into place. According to Tirole (1993:393), firms have a 
high interest to use R&D investments as an instrument to strategically influence the 
market when they constantly have to fear the loss of their market shares.8 This scenario 
is most likely in situations with a patent race, i.e. in situations where the firms face se-
vere competition in the research stage.9 There, the innovation success is a priori uncer-
tain; the probability to succeed depends upon recent and past investment into R&D of 
all competitors. In the end, only one firm can succeed in implementing and launching its 
innovations, while the others have to suffer losses due to the R&D-investment expendi-
tures. As a consequence, in models of patent races, threat of potential competition indu-
ces also the market leader to invest heavily into R&D. As a consequence, there may be 
a high incentive to internalise spillover effects within R&D-cooperations. On the other 
hand, there are some doubts whether firms, especially those that have been successful in 
building up high market power, actually have an incentive to cooperate in R&D. One 
reason is that high market power reflects efficient research and production. Therefore, 
this firm is not easily affected. Or, it may even fear to increase the probability of their 
competitors winning the race by passing on its internal research results via co-ordina-
tion. In these cases, spillovers may even hinder firms from co-operating in R&D. 
                                                 
8  According to Mazzucato (1998) and Symeonides (1996:55) increasing concentration will not occur 
because of diminishing returns, even without spillover effects. Mazzucato (1998:66) calls it the prob-
lem of dynamic diseconomies of scale. The potential for further cost reduction due to innovations 
may shrink with increasing market share. In this case, there may be leapfrogging through small firms 
with drastic innovations, especially if they are able to exploit economies of scale- and scope by 
networking and clustering. According to Mazzucato, spillover effects increase the probability for this 
leapfrogging. 
9  See also Katz and Ordover (1990). For an overview of models of patent races see Reinganum (1989). 
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3. Empirical  Analysis 
3.1  Data Source and Definition of the Variables 
We analyse the empirical relevance of spillover effects for R&D-cooperations with the 
help of a cross-sectional analysis, based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), the 
German contribution to the Community Innovations Survey (CIS). In the set of 1993 all 
relevant data have been available simultaneously.10 With respect to the choice of the va-
riables, the analysis comes as close as possible to the theoretical considerations. First of 
all, the relevant data set comprises only firms for which there are data on R&D-coope-
rations with direct competitors.11 Thereby, we estimated the internalisation aspect of 
R&D-cooperations by the help of a logistic regression model, i.e., the incentive for 
R&D-cooperations has been approximated by the probability with which firms 
cooperate in R&D. This is due to the fact that the available data set does not contain 
information about the actual number of R&D-cooperations, but only whether firms have 
been engaged in R&D-cooperations at all.  
Secondly, in our analysis the capability to appropriate R&D-results is translated into the 
empirics by the help of firm data on the effectiveness of various appropriation facilities. 
By running a factor analysis the overall number of appropriation facilities could be 
reduced to three main groups: official measures like patents and registered designs, 
firm-specific measures like time lead, complex product design and secrecy, and finally, 
low fluctuation of qualified personnel12. In our view, the theoretical definition is best 
approximated when there is no means for knowledge protection that firms judge as 
really effective.13 Within the MIP, the effectiveness of the various appropriation 
facilities has been measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 5 points. We then measured 
lack of appropriation of one group of appropriation facility as one minus the ratio 
between the total score actually achieved and the maximum score that is achievable 
within the respective group of appropriation facility. For instance, if firms judge patents 
                                                 
10  For a description of the MIP see ZEW (1998).The argument of a lack of up-to-date data can be op-
posed by the fact that there are no big changes to be expected within short run with regard to the gen-
eral attitudes of firms towards spillover effects and R&D cooperations. 
11  In contrast, the indicator ‘cooperation variety’ in the analysis of König et al. (1994) measures only 
the extend to which spillovers influence the degree of variety in cooperation partners. It also includes 
cooperations with universities and research institutes, and thus does not reflect the competitive 
element of spillovers. 
12  The terminology is similar to Harhoff (1997:348). The results of the fatcor analysis are given in the 
appendix. 
13  In contrast, König et al. (1994) see spillovers arising whenever firms judge ‘firm-specific appropria-
tion facilities’ as effective in protecting internal research results, since – in their view - the latter di-
rectly reflects the reaction of the firms to an ineffective patenting system. Despite of the appeal of this 
view, no high and significant negative correlation could be found between high effectiveness of firm 
specific appropriation facilities on the one hand and ineffective patenting system on the other hand.  
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as very effective (score =5) and registered design as medium effective (score=3) the 
spillovers due to the patenting system takes the value 1-((5+3)/10). Finally, the 
indicator for overall spillovers is a weighted average of the spillovers due to the three 
main groups of protective facilities. 
Table 1 gives an overview of spillover effects in various industries.14 For instance, in 
the data processing and electronics industry some 30 per cent of research results cannot 
be appropriated on average, whereas about 51 per cent can not be appropriated through 
the patenting system. According to these descriptive results in table 1, the critical value 
of spillovers that resulted from the theoretical model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin fits 
to the assessment of firms as long as it concerns the patent system. In contrast, it looks 
like as if firm-specific appropriation facilities are much more capable to protect 
knowledge as compared to the patenting system. Therefore, firms presumably use firm-
specific appropriation facilities as a reaction on insufficient patent protection – similar 
to the basic assumption in König et al. However, the role as well as the effectiveness of 
the various appropriation facilities differ between industries. For instance, the result of 
Mansfield prevails again, where patenting was found to be relevant for pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals and mineral-oil processing, while they had only limited relevance in 
industries like office machinery.15  
Table 1: Knowledge spillovers in manufacturing industries 
Type of appropriation facility   
General 
Patents Firm-specific  Personnel 
Mining  0,49  0,68 0,51 0,28 
Wood  products  0,37  0,59 0,33 0,19 
Food and Textiles  0,35  0,57  0,30  0,18 
Ceramics  0,36  0,55 0,31 0,21 
Steel and Metal products  0,36  0,53  0,35  0,20 
Precision /optical instruments  0,32  0,52  0,27  0,15 
Rubber  products  0,30  0,52 0,25 0,16 
Electronics  0,33  0,51 0,30 0,16 
Automobiles and aircraft  0,31  0,49  0,29  0,15 
Chemicals  0,29  0,46 0,25 0,16 
Machinery  0,30  0,46 0,28 0,17 
Source:  Mannheim Innovation Panel 1993. 
With respect to market structure, we have chosen indicators following the concept of 
the ‘optimal intensity of competition’. According to Kantzenbach16 this is given within 
a wide oligopoly, i.e., a market that is characterised by a relatively small number of 
firms, thus with relatively high concentration, but that is open for potential competition. 
                                                 
14  The classification of the industries is given in the appendix. 
15  Cited from Geroski (1995). With regard to appropriation conditions, and thus with respect to the rele-
vance of spillover effects see also Symeonides (1996). 
16  Cited from Berg (1993: 245). 
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As indicators we use therefore firstly, the level of the Herfindahl-Index of 1993 
measuring the absolute level of concentration, and secondly, the average rate and the 
range with which concentration as well as the number of firms within an industry have 
been changing since the end of the seventies, indicating intensified and potential 
competition. These are given in Monopolkommission (1996). Due to differences in the 
industrial classification, the Herfindahl-index that fits to the classification in the MIP is 
a weighted average of the Herfindahl-indices of the industries at three-digit-level. The 
weights are the number of firms of the respective industry on the three-digit-level 
relative to the total number of firms of the aggregated industry on the MIP-level. An 
additional indicator for potential competition is directly given within the MIP. There, 
firms have been asked to assess the previous and the expected intensity of competition 
within the output market where they are operating.  
According to table 2, the criteria for the optimal intensity of competition are mostly ful-
filled by precision and optical instruments and data processing and electronics. Very 
competitive industries are further on steel and metal products, wood and paper products, 
and rubber products. With respect to rubber products and data processing and electro-
nics, the enormous change and variation in the number of firms indicate a market that is 
open for potential competition. In contrast, chemical industry, and automobiles and airc-
raft are industries characterised by stable concentration, i.e., that are not very affected 
from (potential) competition. 
Table 2: Concentration and Competition in Manufacturing 
  Herfindahl-Index  Change in firm number 





Machinery  2,2  46,5  -1,4  42,8  7,3  1,9  4,3 -  + 
Food/textiles  4,8  9,6  -1,9  11,9  4,2 -0,5  4,2  -  - 
Steel/metal  6,2  41,3  -11,1  14,8  6,0 1,0 5,1  -  + 
Rubber products  6,9  16,1  -6,5  7,5  10,7  4,1  4,9  - + 
Wood/paper  8,0  12,3  4,5  12,2  6,0 -1,0  5,0  -  + 
Ceramics  12,10  4,6  -1,5  5,0  9,7 -2,0  4,0  -  - 
Precision/ optical  15,0  15,8  4,0  18,1  5,5 -1,3  3,4  +  + 
Chemicals  33,9  6,4  -1,7  5,7  2,5 0,2 2,1 +  - 
DP/electronics  60,6  7,9  1,7  12,4  12,0  4,1  5,1  + + 
Auto/aircraft  99,8  5,1  0,2  5,2  6,0 -1,3  4,6  +  - 
Median 12,1  12,3  3,5
a  11,9 6,0  1,7
a  4,6    
a Median of the absolute values; light shading stands for values below, dark shading for those above the 
mean value. 
Source: Monopolkommission  (1996). 
Table 2 only describes the market structure on the German product markets. However, 
additionally intensive international competition may be expected in some industries, 
especially in electronics and data processing, and automobiles and aircraft. With respect 
to the latter, Hammes (1994) and Graves (1996) explain the competitive pressure with 
the success of Japanese firms. They are gaining ground due to their capacity to keep on 
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producing new goods while they are at the same time continuously lowering production 
costs. According to Hammes, intensive competition in automobiles additionally results 
from the extremely high fixed costs for R&D in times of shrinking product life cycles. 
Thus, immense investment into R&D has to pay for itself within increasingly shorter 
time periods. Table 2 can also only indirectly account for competition on the research 
stage of the innovation process. Competitive scenarios that are similar to models of 
patent races however, may prevail in R&D-intensive industries like machinery, 
chemicals and especially automobiles and aircraft, data processing and electronics, and 
the precision and optical instruments industry. 
The role of market structure for the internalisation effect of R&D-cooperations then has 
been analysed by looking at the effect that spillovers have - given they are interacted 
with market structure. The idea behind is that high incentives to cooperate in R&D may 
be expected whenever firms are faced with spillover effects as well as intensive 
competition. In detail, the role of market structure is first of all, indirectly analysed by 
testing for differences in the probability for R&D-cooperations due to spillovers arising 
in industries that are charcterized by intensive competition. Alternatively, we directly 
interacted the spillover variable with dummies for market structure. Here, due to 
correlations among the individual indicators for market structure which are sufficiently 
high such that they bias parameter estimation, but too low to allow an interpretable 
factor analysis, we have selected the Herfindahl-Index, the change in the number of 
firms and the intensity of expected competition, since they can be seen as best 
indicators for the above mentioned characteristics of the optimal intensity of 
competition.  
However, table 1 together with table 2 let presume that spillovers may be interrelated 
with market structure. This raises the question of exogeneity of the explanatory 
variables. On the one hand, spillovers may intensify (potential) competition. Thus, the 
variables for market structure may not be seen as exogenous anymore, but are rather 
determined by spillovers. However, one can presume that spillover effects do not 
dramatically influence market structure within one single period. On the other hand, just 
the other way round, spillover effects themselves may be determined by market 
structure and may not be exogenous anymore, since firms that are faced with intensive 
competition may try to prevent spillovers from arising. This problem has been solved by 
explicitly taking into account that these firms may first choose among the different 
appropriation facility, especially those that are different from the patenting system, 
before they decide about participating in R&D-cooperations. Thus, we asked whether 
the fact that the level of spillovers depends on the type of appropriation facility accounts 
for different influences of spillovers on R&D-cooperations.17 As a consequence, in the 
                                                 
17 With this, we implicitly ask for the ‘true’ spillovers for which the theoretical relationship between 
spillovers and R&D-cooperations is valid. 
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case where firms are able to protect knowledge through some mechanism spillovers 
have no or only low effects on R&D-cooperations, despite intensive competition; 
except, these alternative appropriation facilities are as ineffective as the patenting 
system.  
Finally, we included several controlling variables that may determine the innovation 
process and thus, the propensity to cooperate in R&D. These are industry and firm-size 
dummies as well as impediments for innovations. With respect to the latter, by running 
a factor analysis we were able to reduce the various impediments for innovations into 
four main groups: first, factors like costs and risks related with innovation projects, 
second, government regulation or slow administration, third, lack of internal capital or 
insufficient access to external financing, and finally, what we called ‘linkages’; these 
comprise problems that arise due to lack of willingness to innovate within the individual 
firm or at the side of suppliers and customers, or that arise due to insufficient access to 
relevant information. 
3.2 Empirical  Results 
Whether there is empirical evidence for the hypotheses above can be seen from the 
following results. Thereby, the first part focuses on possibly different influences of 
spillovers on R&D-cooperations, depending on the specific industries or on the degree 
of concentration and competition. The second part then asks for different influences of 
spillovers on R&D-cooperations taking into account that the level of spillover depends 
on the type of appropriation facility. Here again, we analyse both, spillovers in various 
industries as well as interacted with the indicators for market structure.  
Spillovers, Market Structure and R&D-Cooperations at First Glance 
In general, one can presume from the results in table 3 that the incentive to cooperate in 
R&D increases with the degree of competition when spillover effects arise. R&D-coo-
perations are strongly encouraged by spillover effects in machinery, in automobiles and 
aircraft, data processing and electronics, and in precision and optical instruments. 
Furthermore, highly positive and significant coefficients of spillovers prevail in the 
competitive industries machinery and especially in the precision and optical instruments 
industry, as well as when spillover effects are interacted with the intensity of competi-
tion. However, noticeably significant coefficients prevail also in industries that are – ac-
cording to table 2 - not at all characterised by intensive competition, i.e., in the food and 
textiles industry, and in the chemical industry. Instead, spillovers in very competitive 
industries like rubber products, data processing and electronics, and automobiles and 
aircraft do not show significant influences. 
There are mainly two reasons that may account for these results: Firstly, intensified 
competition may lead to a scenario where the competitive effect is too high to be 
counterweighted by the reduction of the research cost within R&D-cooperations. In that 
  13 
IWH ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
case, the individual firm facing intensive competition may be induced to search for 
effective means other than the patenting system to protect knowledge. As a 
consequence, spillovers are low, and when firms do not cooperate each firm has – like 
Shy (1996: 233) describes it – ‘a lot to gain from R&D since under small spillover 
effects, the R&D intensifies the cost advantage of the firm that undertakes a higher level 
of R&D’. From table 1 we have seen that firms that are not able to protect their research 
effectively through patents and registered designs may search for more effective 
appropriation facilities. Accordingly, insignificant coefficients let presume that 
spillovers do not arise because of effective firm specific appropriation facilities. 
Therefore, although spillovers may have a strong influence on R&D-cooperations 
whenever they arise in competitive industries, the coefficients are not significant due to 
the low number of firms that are not able to appropriate at all. 
Second, insignificant but highly positive coefficients in the case of automobiles and 
aircraft, and data processing and electronics may be due to the fact that firms operating 
in these industries have generally a high incentive to cooperate in R&D. According to 
Hammes (1994), industries like electronics, chemicals, automobiles, and machinery show 
a high degree of cooperation anyway18. He justifies this with three properties cha-
racterising these industries: They use technology intensively, they have a global orien-
tation, and firms in these industries are producing complex and differentiated products. 
One of the most convincing arguments in favour of cooperations is the flexibility that 
allows firms to handle changing and country-specific needs. The significant coefficient 
when costs or risks are hampering innovation may additionally speak in favour of this 
presumption. 
The drastic influence of spillovers in the chemical industry together with the significant 
coefficient of the Herfindahl-Index for R&D-cooperation – without spillovers - reflect a 
result in Gerybadze et al. (1997) that is similar to the one just mentioned: They point at 
the increasing tendency of firms within the chemical industry to specialise on specific 
technologies within R&D. Especially dominant firms within the chemical industry have 
been intensively outsourcing R&D-units to producers that are specialised in the specific 
competencies. R&D-cooperations with firms that are competent in the specific field 
may provide access to up-to-date knowledge. Or, these cooperations enable firms to 
build up a common pool of qualified staff. 
                                                 
18  Hammes (1994:216-7) analyses strategic alliances in general. His study therefore, goes beyond the 
topic at hand. However, his results can be applied here, too, since R&D can be seen as one of the 
three basic motivations for building strategic alliances, next to production and marketing. See here 
also Hagedoorn (1997). 
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Table 3: Spillovers, Market Structure and R&D-Cooperations 
Number of observations   616  616 
Deviation
 a) 40,39  251,13 
Correct Classification (in per cent)   60,71  79,22 
Influencing variables
 b) c) Exp(ß)
 d) Exp(ß)
 d) 
Industry-specific spillovers     
 Food/textile  3,77   
 Machinery  1,61   
 Chemicals  2,59   
 Automobiles/aircraft  1,17   
 Data  Processing/Electronics  1,42   
 Rubber  products  0,84   
 Ceramics  0,82   
 Steel/Metal  products  0,46   
 Precision/optical  instruments  1,56   
 Wood  products  1,11   
Interaction spillovers – market structure     
 Herfindahl    0,77 
  Change in firm number    0,73 
  Expected intensity of competition    1,43 
Indicators for market structure     
 Herfindahl  1,21   
  Change in firm number  0,95   
  Expected intensity of competition  1,03   
Firm Size     
 Medium    0,42 
 Large    0,84 
Impediments for innovation     
 Linkages  0,85  0,91 
  Costs and risks  0,92  1,27 
 Government  1,04  1,13 
 Finance  0,89  0,82 
a Difference between the Loglikelihood measure of the estimation without the exogenous variables and 
the estimations where the exogenous variables are included. The larger the value the better the fit of the 
model. - 
b To include firm-size or industry dummies in the first regression was not possible due to high 
correlations with some firm-specific spillovers. Instead market structure indicators are included. - 
c In the 
second regression, additionally industry dummies have been included. They showed significant 
influences except for steel and metal products. - 
d Dark shading is equivalent with a significance level of 
95%, light shading with 90% significance. 
Source:  MIP 1993, Monopolkommission (1996), own calculations. 
 
The Internalisation Effect Reconsidered 
According to the results in table 4, the incentive to cooperate in R&D depends crucially 
on the type of appropriation facility that firms use to protect knowledge. These results 
make clear that the true spillovers, i.e., spillovers that are sufficiently high such that 
R&D-cooperation is profitable, only arise whenever also firm-specific appropriation fa-
cilities are not effective. This can most of all be seen from the strong and significant 
coefficients when spillovers arise due to lack of appropriation from firm-specific means 
as compared to coefficients of spillovers due to an ineffective patenting system. It looks 
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like as if firms trade-off between the returns from ‘internalising’ research by keeping it 
secret etc., and the return from internalising it by coordinating R&D with competitors. 
 
Table  4: Industry-specific spillovers and R&D-cooperations – various appropriation 
facilities 
Number of observations  620  622  639 
Deviation 26,79
  53,66 20,54 
Correct Classification (in per cent)   59,35  62,54  60,72 
Influencing variables
 a)  Exp(ß) Exp(ß) Exp(ß) 
Industry-specific spillovers  Patents Firm-Specific  Personnel 
 Food/textile  1,18  4,70  1,67 
 Machinery  1,64  1,76  0,99 
 Chemicals  1,67  3,03  1,23 
  Automobiles/aircraft  1,02 1,10 1,23 
 Data  Processing/Electronics  1,20  1,25  1,69 
 Rubber  products  0,67  2,53  0,67 
  Ceramics  0,92 1,22 0,62 
  Steel/Metal  products  0,59 1,00 0,57 
 Precision/optical  instruments  1,22  2,11  1,37 
  Wood  products  1,12 1,64 0,79 
Indicators for market structure       
 Herfindahl  1,24  1,13  1,20 
  Change in firm number  0,98  0,93  0,96 
  Expected intensity of competition  1,03  1,03  1,02 
Number of observations  620  622  639 
Deviation  251,08 258,29 259,61 
Correct Classification (in per cent)   79,03
  78,46 79,19 
Interaction spillovers - market structure       
  Herfindahl-index  0,81 0,80 0,94 
  Change in firm number  0,92  0,87  0,72 
  Expected intensity of competition  1,08  1,65  1,27 
Firm-Size     
 Medium  0,42  0,41  0,44 
  Large  0,84 0,87 0,86 
Impediments for innovation       
  Linkages  0,92 0,93 0,93 
  Costs and risks  1,26  1,26  1,28 
  Government  1,13 1,15 1,17 
 Finance  0,85  0,83  0,85 
a In the first three regressions impediments for innovation had the same values, but have not been signifi-
cant. In the second three regressions additionally industry dummies have been included. Coefficients 
were similar to the ones from the regressions in table 3.  
Source:  MIP 1993, own calculations. 
This latter presumption seems to be even more relevant when the intensity of competi-
tion is taken into account. R&D-cooperations are significantly influenced when spillo-
vers arise in machinery, rubber products, precision and optical instruments and – to 
some degree – also in data processing and electronics, thus, in industries that are cha-
racterised by intensive competition. Additionally, it is the interaction between spillovers 
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on the one hand and the expected intensity of competition or the change in firm number 
on the other hand, that influences significantly the incentive for R&D-cooperations. Fi-
nally, especially the result in data processing and electronics, precision and optical in-
struments, and in rubber products point out that the trade off between R&D-cooperati-
ons and alternative appropriation facilities becomes more relevant with increasing com-
petition. Only when firms are not able to protect their research through appropriation fa-
cilities other than the patenting system spillover effects are sufficiently high such that 
the internalisation in cooperations outweigh the competitive effect from research which 
has been increased due to intensified competition. Therefore, until now, the results 
speak in favour of the presumption from the theoretical considerations: the threat of 
potential competition may induce also the market leader to invest heavily into R&D. As 
a consequence, there may be a high incentive to internalise spillover effects within 
R&D-cooperations. 
However, there is also some evidence for the hypothesis that in industries that are cha-
racterised by high competition in the research stage, the co-ordination of research 
results is rather seen as a danger of the own market share. Most of all this can be seen 
from the relatively weak and insignificant coefficients for automobiles and aircraft, and 
for data processing and electronics as compared to the strong and significant 
coefficients of the other industries – as long as firm-specific appropriation facilities are 
considered. From the classification of industries in the appendix, it becomes clear that 
these industries include highly R&D-intensive branches. This is aircraft in automobiles, 
and it is manufacturing data processing machines and television and communication 
equipment in electronics. In these branches, high pressure from competition in the 
research stage can be expected. Together with the theoretical considerations above it 
may therefore be presumed that firms from electronics and from automobiles and 
aircraft do not see R&D-cooperations as a method to internalise spillover effects. Rather 
they may judge R&D-cooperations as an additional channel through which internal 
knowledge can spill over to other firms. 




The empirical results support in general the presumption that with intensified competi-
tion also the influence of spillovers on R&D-cooperation increases. Strong and signifi-
cant influences of spillovers show up in competitive industries – most of all in precision 
and optical instruments, as well as when spillovers are interacted with indicators for the 
intensity of competition. However, competition seems to induce firms to trade off bet-
ween alternative appropriation facilities and R&D-cooperations. True spillovers, i.e., 
spillovers that are sufficiently high such that the internalisation effect from cooperation 
more than outweighs the competitive effect from research, only arise whenever firms 
are not able to protect their research results through any appropriation facility. This can 
be seen from strong and significant coefficients whenever firms are not able to protect 
their knowledge through firm-specific appropriation facilities as compared to relatively 
weak and insignificant coefficients in the case of an ineffective patenting system.  
There is also some evidence that spillover effects may even hinder firms from co-opera-
ting with other firms in R&D. Most of all this can be seen from the relatively weak and 
insignificant coefficients for automobiles and aircraft, and for data processing and elect-
ronics, as compared to the strong and significant coefficients of the other industries – as 
long as firm-specific appropriation facilities are considered. What precisely supports 
this presumption is the fact that in both industries there are branches where high 
pressure from potential competition on the research stage may be expected. In the case 
of electronics this is manufacturing data processing machines and equipment. In the 
case of automobiles etc. this is aircraft and spacecraft. Taking this together with the 
positive overall influence of spillovers in these industries one conclusion may be drawn 
which is different from the general theoretical hypothesis: If there is the threat of 
existing or potential competition on both stages of the decision process, the relationship 
between spillover effects and R&D-cooperations can no longer be expected to be linear. 
Rather, it may be backward sloping when there is already high pressure from 
competition on the research stage. 
These empirical results let presume that one crucial assumption within the basic 
theoretical models of the relationship between spillovers and R&D-cooperations may 
not be fulfilled: In contrast to these modells, spillovers may not simply arise propor-
tionally to the level of R&D produced within the economy; rather, they are endgenous; 
they are influenced by each firm’s ability and decision to protect own and to use 
external knowledge; and the degree of (potential) competition seems to play a crucial 
role in this decision. Up to now, this results from a very simple empirical analysis. In 
future work, the relationship between spillovers and R&D-cooperations will have to 
take into account more explicitly – theoretically as well as empirically - the 
interdependencies between the level and the effects of spillovers and the intensity of 
competition or market structure in general.  
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Table A1: Classification of Industries: 
Terminology in the 
text 






Mining  Mining, minerals, energy and water supply  10-14, 40, 41  0 
Food 
Products/Textiles 
Food manufacturing, Tobacco manufactures, 
textiles and wearing apparel 
15, 16, 17, 
18, 19 
0 
Wood Products  Manufacture of wood and paper products, 
printing and publishing; manufacture of 
furniture, jewellery, music instruments, sporting 
goods and manufacturing industries not 
classified elsewhere (n.e.c.) 
20, 21, 22.2, 
22.3, 36 
0 
Chemicals  Chemical industry, mineral oil processing 
manufacture of coal 
24, 23  1 
0 
Rubber Products  Manufacture of rubber and plastics  25  0 
Ceramics  Manufacture of glass, pottery and earthenware  26  0 
Metal Products  Manufacture of fabricated metal products  27  0 
Steel Processing  Iron and steel basic industries  28  0 
Machinery  Manufacture of machinery, weapons; electrical 
appliances and houseware n.e.c. 
29 1 
Electronics  Manufacture of office, computing and 
accounting machinery, radio, television and 
communication equipment 
Manufacture of electricity distribution and 
control apparatus etc. 






Manufacture of medical appliances, appliances 
for measuring, checking etc.,  




Automobiles/Aircraft Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft, 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, parts and 
accessoires, 
Manufacture of transport equipment, n.e.c., 




Construction Construction 45.2  0 
Services
b  Data processing a. database, research and 
development, technical, physical a. chemical 
services, 
Architecture- a. engineering,  
Recycling, metal waste and scrap 







a ISIC-Classification, ‘0’ represents non R&D-intensive industries, ‘1’: high-level technologies, ‘2’: 
R&D-intensive industries. 
b Classification following the ISIC/SITC-Classification [Grupp and Gehrke (1994)] 
Source:  ZEW (1998), ISIC-Classification, UNIDO (1997). 
  21 
IWH ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table A2: Results of the Factor Analysis ‘Appropriation Facilities’ 
 Main  factors 
Facilities Patents  Firm-Specific  Personnel 
Registered product design   0,754     
Secrecy product innovation    0,735   
Complex product design     0,667   
Patents product innovation  0,819     
Qualified personnel product innovation      0,800 
Time lead product innovation    0,598   
Other rights  0,801     
Secrecy process innovation    0,725   
Complex process design    0,699   
Patents process innovation  0,831     
Qualified personnel process innovation      0,886 
Time lead process innovation    0,574   
a Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. 
Source:  Mannheim Innovation Panel (1993), own calculations. 
 
Table A3: Results of the Factor Analysis ‘Impediments for Information’ 
 Main  Factors
a 
Impediments Costs/Risks Regulation  Finance  Linkages 
High risks of innovation  0,538       
Impediments within the firm        0,446 
Lack of info about technology level        0,696 
Lack of info marketing        0,703 
Lack of info external know-how        0,787 
Lack of cooperation with firms        0,566 
Lack of cooperation with universities        0,519 
Restrictive  regulations   0,820    
Bureaucracy   0,858    
Lack of tax incentives    0,485     
Lack of innovation at customers        0,330 
Control of innovation costs  0,506       
Lack of innovation at suppliers        0,372 
Market not yet capable        0,332 
Lack of internal capital       0,972   
Lack of outside capital       0,721   
High costs of innovation  0,796       
Amortisation of costs  0,787       
Imitation 0,479       
Lack of qualified personnel        0,384 
a Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. 
Source:  Mannheim Innovation Panel (1993), own calculations. 
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